ed, when the war broke out. It was the interest of Great
Britain to maintain the treaty, and that is why she acted. It was
against German interest to maintain the treaty, and that is why she
broke it. That is the British and not the German theory, and I could
very well rest my case here. My theory is with the German Chancellor,
that I greatly regret the necessity of violating the Belgian neutrality,
after Belgium had chosen to repel the German overtures for a free
passage.
It is quite certain that the breach of the Belgian neutrality by Germany
was used in Great Britain as a powerful instrument to influence the
public sentiment. Every war must be borne by national unity, and it is
the duty of the nation's leaders to secure such unity by all practicable
means. But has it been forgotten that the attitude of Sir Edward Grey
caused such excellent men as Lord Morley, John Burns, and Sir John
Trevelyan to leave the Cabinet, where they were looked upon as the best
and most liberal members of the ruling combination? Bernard Shaw says of
Great Britain that she has never been at a loss for an effective moral
attitude. Such an attitude is a powerful weapon in diplomatical and
actual warfare, and it must be resorted to, if the necessity arises. But
that cannot blind us to the fact that the British Government allowed the
political interest to be the paramount consideration in this Belgian
neutrality matter. The German interest for not acting on the guarantee
was just as strong as the English to act for it.
The proof is found in the English "White Paper." I cite the famous
reprint of THE TIMES, (Dispatch No. 148 of Aug. 2 to Paris.) Here Sir
Edward Grey says: "We were considering ... whether we should declare
violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli."
"Treaties Must Not Be Overrated."
I am an ardent believer in all international arrangements to prevent
difficulties and wars between nations, and I rejoice with the American
people in the signal success this policy is now having in this country.
But international treaties must not be overrated. There are questions
which cannot be settled by them. It is too difficult to explain just the
nature of such situations as arose in Europe, so I may be permitted for
once to ask this question: Does Prof. Eliot believe that the majority of
the American people think that the unwritten Monroe Doctrine could be
made the subject of arbitration, whether it had a right to exist or to
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