without effect, and we ought at least to know before we grant
it, what advantages may be expected from it.

May not the sum demanded for the support of the queen of Hungary be
employed to promote very different interests? May it not be lavished to
support that power, to which our grants have too long contributed? that
power by which ourselves have been awed, and the administration has
tyrannised without control?

If this sum is really intended to support the queen of Hungary, may we
not inquire how it is to be employed for her service? Is it to be sent
her for the payment of her armies, and the support of her court? Should
we not more effectually secure her dominions by purchasing with it the
friendship and assistance of the king of Prussia, a prince, whose extent
of dominions and numerous forces, make him not more formidable than his
personal qualities.

What may be hoped, sir, from a prince of wisdom and courage, at the head
of a hundred and ten thousand regular troops, with eight millions in his
treasury? How much he must necessarily add to the strength of any party
in which he shall engage, is unnecessary to mention; it is evident,
without proof, that nothing could so much contribute to the
reestablishment of the house of Austria, as a reconciliation with this
mighty prince, and that, to bring it to pass, would be the most
effectual method of serving the unfortunate queen that requires our
assistance.

Why we should despair, sir, of such a reconciliation I cannot perceive;
a reconciliation equally conducive to the real interest of both parties.
It may be proved, with very little difficulty, to the king of Prussia,
that he is now assisting those with whom interests incompatible and
religions irreconcilable have set him at variance, whom he can never see
prosperous but by the diminution of his own greatness, and who will
always project his ruin while they are enjoying the advantages of his
victories. We may easily convince him that their power will soon become,
by his assistance, such as he cannot hope to withstand, and show, from
the examples of other princes, how dangerous it is to add to the
strength of an ambitious neighbour. We may show him how much the fate of
the empire is now in his hands, and how much more glorious and more
advantageous it will be to preserve it from ruin, than to contribute to
its destruction.

If by such arguments, sir, this potent monarch can be induced to act
steadily in defence of