the transports
were stationed, with a convoy of only three men of war, and hinder their
departure.

I hope it will be observed by your lordships, that though the road of
Barcelona is open and indefensible, though the fleet was unprotected by
ships of force, and though they lay, as I am informed, beyond the reach
of the guns on the fortifications upon the shore, I do not require that
Haddock should have destroyed the army and the ships.

I am too well acquainted, my lords, with the lenity of our ministers to
the enemies of their country, and am too well convinced of the prudence
and tenderness of the restrictions by which the power of our admirals is
limited, to expect that our guns should be ever used but in salutations
of respect, or exultations on the conclusion of a peace. I am convinced,
that our ministers would shudder at the name of bloodshed and
destruction, and that they had rather hear that a thousand merchants
were made bankrupts by privateers, or all our allies deprived of their
dominions, than that one Spanish ship was sunk or burnt by the navies of
Britain.

But, my lords, though they are willing to spare the blood of their
enemies, yet surely they might have obstructed their enterprises; they
might have withheld those whom they were unwilling to strike, and have
endeavoured to fright those whom they determined never to hurt.

To speak in terms more adapted to the subject before us: that the fleet
of Spain, a fleet of transports with such a convoy, should lie three
weeks in an open road, professedly fitted out against an ally united to
us by every tie of nature, and of policy, by the solemnity of treaties,
and conformity of interest; that it should lie undisturbed almost within
sight of a British navy; that it should lie there not only without
danger, but without apprehension of danger, has raised the astonishment
of every nation in Europe, has blasted the reputation of our arms,
impaired the influence of our counsels, and weakened the credit of our
publick faith.

There may be some, my lords, that will impute this absurdity of our
conduct, this disregard of our interest, this desertion of our
alliances, and this neglect of the most apparent opportunities of
success, not to cowardice, but treachery; a cause more detestable, as
more atrociously criminal.

This opinion, my lords, I think it not necessary to oppose, both because
it cannot be charged with improbability, and because I think it may be
ea