be expected, and to be set in our consultations
against the advantages which we propose to obtain. It is as rational to
expect, that of an army sent against our enemies, every man should
return unhurt to his acquaintances, as that every merchant should see
his ship and cargo sail safely into port.

If we examine, my lords, the late war, of which the conduct has been so
lavishly applauded, in which the victories which we obtained have been
so loudly celebrated, and which has been proposed to the imitation of
all future ministers, it will appear, that our losses of the same kind
were then very frequent, and, perhaps, not less complained of, though
the murmurs are now forgotten, and the acclamations transmitted to
posterity, because we naturally relate what has given us satisfaction,
and suppress what we cannot recollect without uneasiness.

If we look farther backward, my lords, and inquire into the event of any
other war in which we engaged since commerce has constituted so large a
part of the interest of this nation, I doubt not but in proportion to
our trade will be found our losses; and in all future wars, as in the
present, I shall expect the same calamities and the same complaints. For
the escape of any number of ships raises no transport, nor produces any
gratitude; but the loss of a few will always give occasion to clamours
and discontent. For vigilance, however diligent, can never produce more
safety than will be naturally expected from our incontestable
superiority at sea, by which a great part of the nation is so far
deceived as to imagine, that because we cannot be conquered, we cannot
be molested.

Nor do I see how it is possible to employ our power more effectually for
the protection of our trade than by the method now pursued of covering
the ocean with our fleets, and stationing our ships of war in every
place where danger can be apprehended. If it be urged, that the
inefficacy of our measures is a sufficient proof of their impropriety,
it will be proper to substitute another plan of operation, of which the
success may be more probable. To me, my lords, the loss of some of our
mercantile vessels shows only the disproportion between the number of
our ships of war, and the extent of the sea, which is a region too vast
to be completely garrisoned, and of which the frequenters must
inevitably be subject to the sudden incursions of subtle rovers.

The disposition of our squadrons has been such, as was doubtle