the 17th the two enemies were twelve to
fifteen miles apart, ranged on nearly parallel lines, the British twenty
heading northwest, the French twenty-three southeast. The numerical
difference represents sufficiently nearly the actual difference of
force, although French vessels averaged more powerful than British of
the same rates.

At 6.45 A.M. Rodney signalled that it was his intention to attack the
enemy's rear with his whole force. This was never annulled, and the
purpose governed his action throughout the day. This combination--on the
rear--is the one generally preferable to be attempted when underway, and
the relative situations of the fleets at this moment made it
particularly opportune; for the British, in good order, two cables
interval between the ships, were abreast the rear centre and rear of the
enemy, whose line was in comparison greatly extended,--the result
probably of inferior practical seamanship. To increase his advantage,
Rodney at 7 ordered his vessels to close to one cable, and at 8.30, when
the antagonists were still heading as at daybreak, undertook to lead the
fleet down by a series of signals directive of its successive movements.
In this he was foiled by De Guichen, who by wearing brought what was
previously his van into position to support the extreme threatened. "The
different movements of the enemy," wrote Rodney, "obliged me to be very
attentive and watch every opportunity of attacking them at advantage;" a
sentence that concisely sums up his special excellencies, of which the
present occasion offers the most complete illustration. It may be fully
conceded also that it would have vindicated his high title to fame by
conspicuous results, had the intelligence of his officers seconded his
dispositions.

The forenoon passed in manoeuvres, skilfully timed, to insure a definite
issue. At 11.50 Rodney considered that his opportunity had arrived.
Both fleets were then heading in the same direction, on the starboard
tack, and he had again succeeded in so placing his own that, by the
words of his report, he expected to bring "the whole force of His
Majesty's fleet against the enemy's rear, and of course part of their
centre, by which means the twenty sail of British ships would have been
opposed to only fifteen sail of the enemy's, and must in all probability
have totally disabled them before their van could have given them any
assistance." It would be difficult to cite a clearer renouncement of t