al there." The protestation of
disinterestedness here is somewhat intrusive, and being wholly
unnecessary excites rather criticism than confidence.

Although reasonable precautions had been taken for the security of his
own station, and all circumstances carefully weighed, there was in this
step of Rodney's an assumption of responsibility,--of risk,--as in his
similar action of 1762, before noted. This, as well as the military
correctness of the general conception, deserves to be noted to the
credit of his professional capacity. Making the land about Charleston,
South Carolina, he swept along the coast to the northward, until he
anchored off Sandy Hook, September 14th. The following day he issued an
order to Admiral Arbuthnot, directing him to put himself under his
command and to obey his instructions.

Rodney's coming was a grievous blow to Washington, who instead had
hoped, as Rodney had feared, the arrival of De Guichen, or at the least
of a strong French naval division. The enemy's disappointment is perhaps
the best proof of sagacity in a military movement, but Sandwich's clear
approval was also forthcoming. "It is impossible for us to have a
superior fleet in every part; and unless our commanders-in-chief will
take the great line, as you do, and consider the King's whole dominions
as under their care, our enemies must find us unprepared somewhere, and
carry their point against us." Arbuthnot, nevertheless, saw only
personal injury to himself; a natural feeling, but one which should not
be allowed display. Rodney had given various particular orders, and had
suggested that it would be better that the commander-in-chief on the
station should keep headquarters at New York, leaving the blockade of
Ternay, a hundred and thirty miles distant, to a junior admiral; also,
he intimated the opinion that such a blockade would be better conducted
underway than anchored in Gardiner's Bay, fifty miles from the enemy's
port. Though suggestion did not override discretion, Arbuthnot resented
it in all its forms. After explaining his reasons, he added, "How far,
Sir, your conduct (similarly circumstanced as you are) is praiseworthy
and proper, consequences must determine. Your partial interference in
the conduct of the American War is certainly incompatible with
principles of reason, and precedents of service. The frigates attending
on a cruising squadron you have taken upon you to counter-order, (a due
representation of which and ot