a battle with a force superior by a half to his own; and this
purpose was effected by his skilful management of his fleet, aided by
his adversary's irresolution, notwithstanding that the unusual action of
the wind thwarted his effort to control the situation by gaining the
weather gage. Both the general manoeuvres, and the special dispositions
made of his ships to meet the successive intentions of the enemy, as
they became apparent, showed a mind fortified by previous preparation as
well as by the natural self-possession for which he was conspicuous. It
was eminently a tactical triumph.

A tremendous gale followed, scattered both fleets, and dismasted several
of the French. D'Estaing appeared again off Rhode Island only to notify
Sullivan that he could no longer aid him; and the latter, deprived of an
indispensable support, withdrew in confusion. The disappointment of the
Americans showed itself by mobbing some French seamen in Boston, whither
their fleet retired. "After the enterprise upon Rhode Island had been
planned," continues Washington, in the letter above quoted, "and was in
the moment of execution, that Lord Howe with the British ships should
interpose merely to create a diversion, and draw the French fleet from
the island, was again unlucky, as the Count had not returned on the 17th
to the island, though drawn from it on the 10th; by which the whole was
subjected to a miscarriage." What Washington politicly calls bad luck
was French bad management, provoked and baffled by Howe's accurate
strategy, untiring energy, consummate seamanship, and tactical
proficiency. Clinton's army delivered, the forcing of New York
frustrated, Rhode Island and its garrison saved, by a squadron never
more than two thirds of that opposed to it, were achievements to
illustrate any career; and the more so that they were effected by sheer
scientific fencing, like some of Bonaparte's greatest feats, with little
loss of blood. They form Howe's highest title to fame, and his only
claim as a strategist. It will be observed, however, that the
characteristic of his course throughout is untiring and adequate
adaption to the exigencies of the situation, as momentarily determined
by the opponent's movements. There is in it no single original step.
Such, indeed, is commonly the case with a strictly defensive campaign by
a decisively inferior force. It is only the rare men who solve such
difficulties by unexpected exceptional action.

It is indi