was
wholly disabled, had suffered very considerably; and, while
indispensable repairs could temporarily be made, efficiency was
affected. They needed, besides, immediate water and supplies, as Rodney
himself stated--a want which Hood would have anticipated. To increase
difficulty, the French mounted the batteries of the vessels _en flute_,
and so raised their total nominal force to twenty-eight. Hood was unable
to regain Santa Lucia, because his crippled ships could not beat against
the current. He therefore left it to itself, and bore away to the
northward, where he joined Rodney on May 11th, between St. Kitts and
Antigua. The campaign of 1781, destined to be wholly defensive for the
British, opened under these odds, the responsibility for which lies in
considerable measure on Rodney.
After the junction, the British fleet went to Barbados, where it arrived
May 18th. Meantime, the French had proceeded in force against Santa
Lucia, landing a considerable body of troops, and investing the island
with twenty-five sail-of-the-line, two of which with 1300 soldiers went
on to attempt the British Tobago. The attack on Santa Lucia failed, and
the French returned to Martinique; but learning there that Rodney was at
sea, heading southward, De Grasse became alarmed for his detachment at
Tobago, and moved to its support with his entire fleet. Rodney, knowing
of the detachment only, sent against it six ships under Rear Admiral
Drake; a half-measure severely censured by Hood, whose comments
throughout indicate either a much superior natural sagacity, or else the
clearer insight of a man whose eye dwells steadfastly on the military
situation, untroubled by conflicting claims. "What a wonderful happy
turn would have been given to the King's affairs in this country had Sir
George Rodney gone with his whole force to Tobago as soon as he might,
and in my humble opinion ought to have done. Nay, had he even gone when
Mr. Drake did, the island would have been saved. I laboured much to
effect it, but all in vain, and fully stated my reasons in writing as
soon as the intelligence came. Every ship there with all the troops must
have fallen into our hands two days before De Grasse got there with his
twenty-one sail;" to which Rodney, in full strength, would again have
opposed twenty. "_Now_ the enemy may do as they will;" for they were
united in Martinique, twenty-eight to twenty. In short, Rodney saw at
Tobago only the one French detachment; H
|