r_, _Hector_,
and _Glorieux_ under a weight of successive broadsides that completely
crushed them, separated De Grasse with six companion vessels from his
van and his rear, and placed the British main body to windward of the
French. Both sides were disordered, but the French were not only
disordered but severed, into three formless groups, not to be united
except by a good breeze and exceeding good management, neither of which
was forthcoming. Even to frame a plan operative under such conditions
requires in an admiral accuracy of judgment and readiness rarely
bestowed; but to communicate his designs and enforce execution upon
captains under such a staggering shock of disaster is even more uncommon
of accomplishment. During the remainder of the day light airs from the
eastward prevailed, interspersed with frequent calms; conditions
unfavorable to movement of any kind, but far more to the French,
deprived of concert of purpose, than to the British, whose general
course was sufficiently defined by the confusion of the enemy, and the
accident of a small group surrounding their commander-in-chief, to
capture whom was always a recognized principal object. The very
feebleness of the breeze favored them by comparison; for they had but to
go before it with all their light sails, while their opponents, in order
to join, were constrained to lateral movement, which did not allow the
same canvas.

There was, in short, during the rest of the day an unusual opportunity
for success, on such a scale as should be not only brilliant, but really
decisive of the future course of the war; opportunity to inflict a
maritime blow from which the enemy could not recover. Does it need to
say clearly that here the choice was between a personal triumph, already
secured for the successful admiral, and the general security of the
nation by the "annihilation"--the word is Nelson's--of the enemy? That
Rodney thus phrased the alternative to himself is indeed most unlikely;
but that he failed to act efficiently, to rise to an emergency, for the
possible occurrence of which he had had ample time as well as warning to
prepare, is but too certain. Even after the British had got to windward
of the enemy and seen their disorder, although the signal for the line
was hauled down, none was made for a general chase. That for close
action, hoisted at 1 P.M., was discontinued thirty minutes later, when
five full hours of daylight remained. Even in example the admira