n the postwar division of Germany was first
discussed at the Moscow Conference in 1943) succeeded George F. Kennan
as political adviser to John G. Winant of the European Advisory
Commission shortly after Kennan had persuaded Roosevelt to accept the
Berlin zoning agreements.

* * * * *

It is easy to see why the Soviets wanted the Berlin arrangement which
Roosevelt gave them. It is not difficult to see the British viewpoint:
squeezed between the two giants who were his allies, Churchill tried to
play the Soviets against the Americans, in the interest of getting the
most he could for the future trade and commerce of England.

But why would any American want (or, under any conditions, agree to) the
crazy Berlin agreement? There are only three possible answers:

(1) the Americans who set up the Berlin arrangement--which means,
specifically, George F. Kennan and Philip E. Mosely, representing the
Council on Foreign Relations--were ignorant fools; or

(2) they _wanted_ to make Berlin a powder keg which the Soviets could
use, at will, to intimidate the West; or

(3) they wanted a permanent, ready source of war which the United States
government could use, at any time, to salvage its own internationalist
policies from criticism at home, by scaring the American people into
"buckling down" and "tightening up" for "unity" behind our "courageous
President" who is "calling the Kremlin bluff" by spending to prepare
this nation for all-out war, if necessary, to "defend the interests of
the free-world" in Berlin.

George F. Kennan and Philip E. Mosely and the other men associated with
them in the Council on Foreign Relations are not ignorant fools. I do
not believe they are traitors who wanted to serve the interests of the
Kremlin. So, in trying to assess their motives, I am left with one
choice: they wanted to set Berlin up as a perpetual excuse for any kind
of program which the Council on Foreign Relations might want the
American government to adopt.

Long, long ago, King Henry of England told Prince Hal that the way to
run a country and keep the people from being too critical of how you run
it, is to busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.

A study of President Kennedy's July 25, 1961, speech to the nation about
Berlin, together with an examination of the spending program which he
recommended to Congress a few hours later, plus a review of contemporary
accounts of how the stampeded Congress r