conservative" community leadership
into an effective propaganda effort for one-world socialism.

The World Affairs Center was set up with national headquarters at 345
East 46th Street in New York City, as a formal affiliate of the Foreign
Policy Association, to handle the important job of directing the various
"independent" Councils on World Affairs, located in major cities
throughout the nation. In March, 1960, the FPA merged with the World
Affairs Center to form one organization: the Foreign Policy
Association-World Affairs Center.

* * * * *

The FPA-WAC describes its Great Decisions program as an annual
nation-wide review, by local groups under local sponsorship, of problems
affecting United States Foreign Policy. FPA-WAC provides Fact Sheet
Kits, which contain reading material for these local discussion groups.
These kits present what FPA calls a "common fund of information" for all
participants. They also provide an "opinion" ballot which permits each
participant, at the end of the Great Decisions discussion program, to
register his viewpoint and send it to officials in Washington.

The old IPR line (fostering American policies which helped communists
take over China) was that the Chinese communists were not communists at
all but democratic "agrarian reformers" whom the Chinese people loved
and respected, and whom the Chinese people were going to install as the
rulers of new China, regardless of what America did; and that,
therefore, it was in our best interest to be friendly with these
"agrarian reformers" so that China would remain a friendly power once
the "reformers" took over.

A major objective of the FPA-WAC--since it fell heir to the work of the
IPR--is to foster American diplomatic recognition of red China.

The FPA-WAC, and its subordinate Councils on World Affairs, do this
propaganda job most cleverly. Most FPA spokesmen (except a few like
Cyrus Eaton, who is a darling of the FPA and occasionally writes for its
publications) are "anti-communists" who admit that the Chinese
communists are real communists. They admit that it is not pleasant (in
the wake of our memories of Korea) to think of extending diplomatic
recognition to red China; and they do not always openly advocate such a
move; but their literature and Great Decisions operations and other
activities all subtly inculcate the idea that, however much we may
dislike the Chinese communists, it is highly probable t