can affairs--economic, political,
cultural, social, educational, and even religious--with those of
other nations until the United States will no longer have an
independent policy, either domestic or foreign: until we can not
return to our traditional foreign policy of maintaining national
independence, nor to free private capitalism as an economic system.

The ghastly wartime and post-war decisions (which put the Soviet Union
astride the globe like a menacing colossus and placed the incomparably
stronger United States in the position of appeasing and retreating) can
be traced to persons who were members of the Council on Foreign
Relations.

Consider a specific example: the explosive German problem.

* * * * *

In October, 1943, Cordell Hull (U. S. Secretary of State), Anthony Eden
(Foreign Minister for Great Britain), and V. Molotov (Soviet Commissar
for Foreign Affairs), had a conference at Moscow. Eden suggested that
they create a European Advisory Commission which would decide how
Germany, after defeat, would be partitioned, occupied, and governed by
the three victorious powers. Molotov approved. Hull did not like the
idea, but agreed to it in deference to the wishes of the two others.
Philip E. Mosely, of the CFR, was Hull's special adviser at this Moscow
Conference.

The next month, November, 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt went to
Tehran for his first conference with Stalin and Churchill. Aboard the U.
S. S. _Iowa_ en route to Tehran, Roosevelt had a conference with his
Joint Chiefs of Staff. They discussed, among other things, the post-war
division and occupation of Germany.

President Roosevelt predicted that Germany would collapse suddenly and
that "there would definitely be a race for Berlin" by the three great
powers. The President said: "We may have to put the United States
divisions into Berlin as soon as possible, because the United States
should have Berlin."

Harry Hopkins suggested that "we be ready to put an airborne division
into Berlin two hours after the collapse of Germany."

Roosevelt wanted the United States to occupy Berlin and northwestern
Germany; the British to occupy France, Belgium, and southern Germany;
and the Soviets to have eastern Germany.

At the Tehran Conference (November 27-December 2, 1943), Stalin seemed
singularly indifferent to the question of which power would occupy which
zones of Germany after the war.