aced on a
democratic legislature by a fixed Constitution and a separate executive
exercising a veto. The late Professor Freeman Snow, of Harvard
University, was a strong supporter of this school. His objections to
cabinet government are given in the "Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science" for July, 1892:--

Cabinet government is the government of a party; and for its
successful operation it must have at all times a majority at its
back in Parliament. If it were possible to direct the current of
public opinion into exactly two channels, there would be but two
parties, one of which would generally be in the ascendency; but in
practice this is found to be a very difficult thing to accomplish,
and it becomes the more difficult as the right of suffrage is
extended to the mass of the people, with their ever-varying
interests. In the countries of continental Europe parties, if
indeed they may be said to exist, are broken up into groups, no two
or more of which ever act together for any considerable length of
time; and ministries are without a moment's notice confronted at
brief intervals with opposing majorities, and must give place to
others, whose tenure of office is, however, equally unstable and
ephemeral. There is no other alternative; one of the two great
parties must yield to any faction which becomes strong enough to
hold the balance of power between them, or suffer the inevitable
consequences--instability and impotence of government.

Dr. Snow evidently thought that it is not possible to direct the
current of public opinion into exactly two channels. He certainly had
not the slightest idea that it might be a matter of electoral machinery.

Finally, we may quote the opinion of Mr. James Bryce, M.P., whose
"American Commonwealth" is one of the most complete studies of the
tendencies of democracy in existence. Comparing the English and American
systems, he writes of the former:--

That system could not be deemed to have reached its maturity till
the power of the people at large had been established by the Reform
Act of 1832. For its essence resides in the delicate equipoise it
creates between the three powers, the ministry, the House of
Commons, and the people. The House is strong because it can call
the ministry to account for every act, and can by refusing supplies
co