system, all votes cast for
rejected candidates are ineffective; therefore nearly one-half of the
electors have no voice in the Government. A Liberal elector may live in
a Conservative constituency all his life without having the opportunity
to cast an effective vote. The evil of popular indifference is largely
to be explained by this fact. It is no answer to say that it affects
both parties equally. The trouble is that nearly one-half of the
electors of each party have no influence in deciding who are to
represent the party, and therefore do not help to frame its policy.

This evil would also be entirely removed. Every vote cast would count to
one or the other party. It is not necessary that every vote should be
counted to some one candidate, as the advocates of the Hare system
claim. Votes given to rejected candidates would be in effect just as
much transferred to the successful candidates as by the Hare system.
Moreover, it is an important gain that the candidates of each party
would be ranged in order of favour, as the relative position of the
candidates would be an index of the feeling of each electorate, not only
as regards men but also as regards measures. Therefore, even the votes
given to rejected candidates would affect the framing of the party
policy, and show the progress of public opinion.

+Uncontested Seats.+--At the 1895 election for the Imperial Parliament
no less than 189 seats out of 670 were uncontested. Thus one-quarter of
the people had no opportunity of expressing any opinion. In Australia
the proportion is often quite as large. The present Legislative Council
of Victoria is an extreme instance. One-third of the Council retires
every three years; and at the last election not a single seat was
contested. Only 4 out of the 48 sitting members have had to contest
election. Under these circumstances the holding of an election at all
becomes a farce. No doubt it is very convenient for the favoured
individuals; but as the primary object of elections is the ascertainment
of public opinion, it is very desirable that every seat should be
contested.

The chief cause of this evil is that when one party is strong in an
electorate it is hopeless for the minority to contest it, unless the
majority nominates more than one candidate. On the other hand, the
majority knows that if it does split its votes the minority will
probably win the seat. The result is that the sitting member has a great
advantage, and is of