nt of support which it receives.

The great advantages of this provision are at once apparent. There is no
incentive to limit the number of candidates so as to prevent splitting
the votes. On the contrary, it is to the interest of each party to get
as many strong candidates as possible to stand in its interests. There
will be no necessity to ask any candidate to retire for fear of losing a
seat to the party. Thus the control of nominations, which leads to the
worst abuses of the present system, will be entirely obviated.

Now, suppose that in the instance we have already given each elector is
allowed to vote for one candidate only, the total number of votes
recorded will be 120,000. Then the _unit of representation_ or number of
votes which entitle a party to one senator will be 20,000 votes; each
party will be entitled to one senator for every whole unit of
representation, and the odd senator will go to the party having the
larger remainder. For instance, if the aggregate votes polled by all the
Ministerialist candidates be 72,000, and by the Oppositionist candidates
48,000, the Ministerialists, having three units plus 12,000 remainder,
are entitled to four senators, and the Opposition, having two units plus
8,000, to two senators.

Similarly, if each elector be allowed to vote for a number of
candidates, all these figures will be increased in proportion. For
example, if each elector has three votes, the unit of representation
would be 60,000 votes. The following general rules may therefore be
stated:--

1. The unit of representation is equal to the total number of valid
votes cast at the election, divided by the number of seats.

2. Each party is entitled to one seat for every whole unit of
representation contained in the aggregate votes polled by all its
candidates, and the odd seat goes to the party which has the larger
remainder.

The fact that the last seat has to be assigned to the party which has
the larger remainder is sometimes advanced as an objection, but it is
evidently the fairest possible division that the size of the electorate
will permit. Of course, the larger the electorate the more accurately
proportioned will be the representation. Hence the representation would
be most accurate if the whole assembly were elected in one large
electorate. But if, for the sake of convenience, the assembly be elected
in a large number of electorates in which the relative proportions