would vote at
the second election. All that is necessary is that they place the
candidates in order of preference, 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. Then, instead of
holding a second election between the two who have the greatest number
of first preferences, it is merely necessary for the returning officer
to consult each ballot paper and see which of these two candidates is
higher in order of favour. Thus if one is marked 3 and the other 4, the
vote is counted to the candidate marked 3. This device is assumed to
give exactly the same result as the French plan, providing only that the
same electors vote at both elections, and do not change their views
between the two elections.

But in reality it possesses hardly any of the advantages of the French
plan. It is another instance of the danger of neglecting the factor of
human nature. The French do not go to the trouble and expense of a
second election for nothing. Their plan is far the better. First of all,
consider the candidates. They know well beforehand that unless one of
them gets an absolute majority of the votes at the first election they
will be put to the expense and delay of a second election, therefore it
is to their interest that the number of candidates be restricted. This
tends to keep down the representation to two sections. Next, consider
the electors. They know also that unless they give a majority of votes
to one of the candidates they will be put to the trouble of voting a
second time, therefore they will take good care the votes are not split
up, even if the candidates wanted it. What is the result? Simply that in
the vast majority of cases one of the candidates gets a majority at the
first election, and no second election is necessary; and, most important
of all, the tendency to split up is counteracted.

Now take the Queensland system. None of these checks operate. The
splitting up into groups is actually encouraged, and it is to the
interest of each group to see as many more groups as possible formed, in
order to increase its own relative importance, for the delegates of the
two strongest groups have a chance of election instead of the strongest
group only.

In practice the plan threatens to break down, owing to a practical point
being overlooked. It is evident that the success of the Advance Vote
depends on the electors marking all the preferences. The ballot paper
should be made informal unless all the preferences are given. In
Queensland this has not been done