e first ministry should be merely a provisional ministry, to act till
the first responsible ministry is formed after the election, is
therefore open to serious objection. The leader of the Freetrade party
or the leader of the Protectionist party should be chosen as first
Federal Premier, and the first election should decide which policy is to
be adopted.

Contrast this scheme with the proposals now under consideration. In
Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland bills have been introduced
dividing the States into single-membered electorates, and some of the
smaller States are inclined to use the Block Vote. In Victoria a bad
precedent has been established by giving the party in power the duty of
determining boundaries. From time to time it will be necessary to
rearrange the boundaries, not only on account of movements of population
within the State, but also because the number of representatives which
the State is entitled to will vary. Look forward to the time when the
State becomes entitled to one more representative; every one of the 23
electorates, in which vested interests will have been created, will have
to be altered These are precisely the conditions which have led to the
growth of the gerrymander in the United States.

Already the first scheme submitted to the Assembly has been defeated by
a combination of country members, who held that Melbourne was allotted a
larger share of representation than it now has in the local Parliament.
Whatever may be the arguments by which the disparity between the size
of town and country electorates be supported in local affairs, surely
they cannot apply where national issues only are at stake. The principle
of equal electorates is recognized in the Commonwealth Bill by the rules
for allotting representation to the States. Why not, then, for the
divisions of each State? It is said that a larger proportion of the
electors vote in the town, but it is not those only who vote who are
represented.

In dividing a State into electorates for the purpose of the reform, the
number of electors in each division should therefore form the basis of
proportional distribution. The unit of representation would be the total
number of electors in the State divided by the number of seats. One
representative would be allowed to each division of the State for each
unit of representation, and the remaining seats, if any, would go to
those divisions with the largest remainders.

Coming now to the