ate with the absolute majority is then
elected. We propose to consider the different ways in which elimination
might be made. We assume, in the first place, that each elector has cast
an advance vote--_i.e._, that he has placed all the candidates in order
of preference. The most primitive method is to eliminate at each
successive count the candidate who has least first preferences. This is
the method adopted in the Hare system, and we have already shown that
it is very defective; in fact, it is no improvement at all. The
eliminated candidate might be most in general favour, and might be able
to beat each of the other candidates single-handed. A second method is
to use Preferential Voting to decide which candidate should be
eliminated at each successive count. This is far superior, but it is
extremely complicated, and is open to the objection that when there are
a large number of candidates a small section may cause the rejection of
the general favourite. We propose to describe a method based on the
Block Vote which is much simpler, and which does not lend itself to
abuse. We have shown that the Block Vote works best when the candidates
can be divided into two equal sections of favour and non-favour. Suppose
there are four candidates, the first two preferences should therefore be
counted as effective votes, instead of the first preference only. The
eliminated candidate will then be the least in general favour. A second
count is then made of the three candidates left, and the first
preferences and half of the second preferences are counted as effective,
and the lowest again eliminated. The candidate who has an absolute
majority is then elected. The method may be indefinitely extended; if
there are five candidates the first two preferences and one-half of the
third preferences are counted, and so on. But when there are a great
many candidates more than one might be eliminated. Any number up to
eight could be safely reduced to four at the first count.

FOOTNOTE:

[8] The bracket principle introduced by Professor Nanson into the Hare
system involves a partial recognition of this fact.

CHAPTER IX.

ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT SYSTEM.

+The Double Election.+--In the preceding chapter we have strongly
insisted that the different methods considered for ensuring the return
of the candidate acceptable to all sections are not applicable to the
election of legislators. The true principles of political representatio