us split does take place it
generally results in the resignation of part of the club and the
formation of a separate organization. But in a live club it is
impossible to prevent slight differences of opinion; and an
officer-bearer who has the interests of the club at heart must often
offend small sections who want to exert undue influence. In an election
for president this office-bearer would stand no chance of election if
there are several candidates and any small section likes to put him at
the bottom of the list, so as to give him as many bad marks as possible.
This is the weak point in Preferential Voting; any small section can
ensure the rejection of a general favourite. The greater the number of
candidates the smaller the minority which is able to do this; dummy
candidates may therefore be introduced to make it more certain. The risk
would, however, be very much lessened if the process of gradual
elimination we have described were adopted.

When we come to the election of representatives to a legislature it is
evident at once that Preferential Voting is not applicable at all. We
have shown that the true condition required is not the return of
candidates most in general favour with both parties, but the return of
the candidates most in general favour with each party separately.
Preferential Voting would therefore only be applicable if the electors
of each party voted separately for its own candidates; and even then it
would be open to the objection we have already urged. If it were applied
to the two parties voting together the electors would certainly not be
influenced only by the merit of the candidates. They might record their
honest preferences as regards the candidates of their own party, but
they would naturally place the candidates of the opposing party in
inverse order of merit. The candidates most in general favour would be
those who represented neither party. Suppose there are three candidates
for a single seat, two representing large parties of 49 per cent, each,
and the third a small party of 2 per cent. The electors of the large
parties would be more afraid of one another than of the small party, and
would give their second preferences to its candidate. This candidate,
representing one-fiftieth of the electors, would then actually be
elected; he would receive 202 marks, and neither of the others could
possibly secure more than 200. Moreover, he would still be elected if
the process of elimination were