FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   95   96   97   98   99   100   101   102   103   104   105   106   107   108   109   110   111   112   113   114   115   116   117   118   119  
120   121   122   123   124   125   126   127   128   129   130   131   132   133   134   135   136   137   138   139   140   141   142   143   >>  
t the Hobart election instead of one only; and this is exactly what we advocate. It is also admitted that when two candidates ran together at the first Launceston election the more popular candidate was defeated; and again the _Argus_ correspondent writes of the recent Hobart election:--"The defeat of Mr. Nicholls was doubtless due to the fact of his supporters' over-confidence--nothing else explains it. Many people gave him No. 2 votes who would have given him No. 1 votes had they not felt assured of his success." A second reason why the wrong candidates are liable to be elected is that the process of elimination adopted by all the Hare methods has no mathematical justification. The candidate who is first excluded has one preference only taken account of, while others have many preferences given effect to. We have shown that this glaring injustice was recognized by Mr. Hare, and only adopted as a last resort. Professor Nanson admits that "the process of elimination which has been adopted by all the exponents of Hare's system is not satisfactory," and adds--"I do not know a scientific solution of the difficulty." To bring home the inequity of the process, consider a party which nominates six candidates, A, B, C, D, E, and F, and whose numbers entitle it to three seats, and suppose the electors to vote in the proportions and order shown below on the first count. FIRST SECOND THIRD FOURTH COUNT. COUNT. COUNT. COUNT. 7-vote ADEFBC ADEBC AEBC ABC 6-vote EFDACB EDACB EACB ACB 5-vote CEBDFA CEBDA CEBA CBA 4-vote BDFACE BDACE BACE BAC 4-vote DCEFBA DCEBA CEBA CBA 3-vote FBAECD BAECD BAEC BAC It will be noted that F, having fewest first votes, is eliminated from the second count, D from the third count, and E from the fourth. A has then 13 votes, B 7, and C 9. If the quota be 9 votes, A's surplus would be passed on to B, and A, B, and C would be declared elected. But D, E, and F are the candidates most in general favour, and ought to have been elected. For if any one of the rejected candidates be compared with any one of the successful candidates it will be found that in every case the rejected candidate is higher in order of favour on a majority of the papers. Again, if the Block Vote be applied, by counting three effective votes, the result would be--A 10 votes, B 12, C 9, D 21, E 22, and F
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   95   96   97   98   99   100   101   102   103   104   105   106   107   108   109   110   111   112   113   114   115   116   117   118   119  
120   121   122   123   124   125   126   127   128   129   130   131   132   133   134   135   136   137   138   139   140   141   142   143   >>  



Top keywords:
candidates
 

process

 

election

 
adopted
 

elected

 

candidate

 

elimination

 

favour

 
rejected
 
Hobart

admitted

 

advocate

 

BDFACE

 

DCEFBA

 

FBAECD

 

ADEFBC

 

FOURTH

 

SECOND

 

fewest

 
CEBDFA

EFDACB
 

fourth

 
majority
 

papers

 

higher

 

successful

 

result

 
applied
 
counting
 

effective


compared
 

proportions

 

surplus

 

passed

 

general

 

declared

 

eliminated

 

suppose

 

mathematical

 

justification


excluded

 

preference

 

Nicholls

 
doubtless
 

methods

 

account

 

glaring

 

injustice

 

effect

 

preferences