FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   317   318   319   320   321   322   323   324   325   326   327   328   329   330   331   332   333   334   335   336   337   338   339   340   341  
342   343   344   345   346   347   348   349   350   351   352   353   354   355   356   357   358   359   360   361   362   363   364   365   366   >>   >|  
years, unless sooner removed by the President, upon reasons to be communicated by him to the Senate. He should not be interested either directly or indirectly in railroad securities. The Interstate Commerce Commission should be continued as an advisory board. It should upon the whole retain its present functions and should be consulted by the director-general in all matters requiring expert investigation. A number of divisions or sub-bureaus should be established, and each should be entrusted, under the supervision of the director-general, with such duties as may be deemed necessary to secure the greatest efficiency. There should be a division charged with the duty of carefully examining and compiling the detailed reports which the various companies should by law be required to make to the bureau. An inspection service should also be established, similar to that now maintained by the Treasury and Post-office Departments. Its officers should be empowered to enter all railroad offices and examine the companies' books, board trains and employ other legal means to detect violations of the railroad law and report them to the chief of the bureau. Railroad companies might be permitted to make interstate rates, but all schedules should be submitted to the bureau for approval or revision. Legal provision should be made against every sort of speculation in railroad stocks on the part of railroad officers, who should, in addition, be prohibited from sharing in the profits of favorite rates, as at present. All executive officers and directors of railroad companies should, like officers of national banks, be required to qualify by taking an oath of office, and should be held to strict accountability for their official acts. Officers of railroad companies should not be allowed to receive and use proxies at stockholders' meetings. The director-general should have the power, when he has proof that a railroad manager is persistently violating the law, to remove him and to appoint a receiver to take charge of the road until its owners can make provision and furnish sufficient guarantee for a more responsible management. Such a procedure would not be without analogy in the sphere of Federal authority. The Comptroller of the Currency is authorized by law to remove the derelict officials of a national bank and place its business in charge of a receiver. The beneficial effect of this provision is evinced in the extreme rareness of such
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   317   318   319   320   321   322   323   324   325   326   327   328   329   330   331   332   333   334   335   336   337   338   339   340   341  
342   343   344   345   346   347   348   349   350   351   352   353   354   355   356   357   358   359   360   361   362   363   364   365   366   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

railroad

 

companies

 
officers
 

bureau

 
provision
 

general

 
director
 

charge

 
present
 

established


office

 
required
 

national

 
remove
 
receiver
 

beneficial

 

qualify

 

executive

 

effect

 

directors


official
 

accountability

 
strict
 
business
 

taking

 
profits
 

evinced

 

extreme

 

rareness

 
revision

speculation
 

stocks

 
sharing
 

officials

 

prohibited

 
addition
 

favorite

 

analogy

 

owners

 

sphere


authority

 

appoint

 

Federal

 

furnish

 

responsible

 
procedure
 

management

 

sufficient

 

guarantee

 
approval