object, geographical or political. What is of importance is the
strategical object. The strategical object is the essential, the
geographical object is only accessory. Once the essential object
is attained, the accessory object is acquired of itself. Once the
French armies had been beaten, thrown back, and dispersed, Von
Kluck could return to the capital and take it easily.

Conceive of him, on the other hand, attacking the capital with the
army of Manoury on his right, which constituted a serious menace
to his left, and in front or him the British army and the Fifth
French Army; he might have been caught as in a vise between these
forces while all his activity was being absorbed by his attack
on the intrenchments around Paris.

It has been said that if Von Kluck had won the French capital, as
it seemed he might, the French could not have gained the Battle of
the Marne, and the result of the war might have been very different.
It was, however, no mistake on the part of Von Kluck, no false
maneuver on his part, that determined the victory of the Marne.
Von Kluck did exactly what he ought to have done; the decision
taken by the German General Staff was exactly what it ought to
have taken, and what was foreseen during the whole course of the
war.

It was on September 4, 1914, in the morning, that the observations
made by the French cavalry, as well as by British aviators and
those of the army of Manoury and the military government of Paris,
made it clear that the German right (Von Kluck's army) was bending
its march toward the southeast in the direction of Meaux and
Coulommiers, leaving behind it the road to Paris.

At this moment the Fifth French' Army of the left was ready to
meet the German forces in a frontal attack, and it was flanked
toward the northwest by the British army and by General Manoury's
army to the northeast of the capital.

The disposition of forces aimed at in General Joffre's order of
August 25 was thus accomplished; the French escaped the turning
movement, and they were in a position to counter with an enveloping
movement themselves. The wings of the French forces found support
in their maneuvering in their contact with the strongholds of Paris
and Verdun. Immediately the commander in chief decided to attack,
and issued on the evening of September 4 the series of general
orders, given as an appendix to this volume, which announced the
big offensive and eventually turned the tide of battle.