luck during
the latter's advance, and that, consequently, he did not think it
prudent to risk heavy loss of life until he knew the situation to
westward of him. There was some sharp "bomb" work at Fere Champenoise
on September 8, and then came the night of the 8th.

It will be remembered that at the close of the battle of Montmirail
on the evening of September 8, 1914, the western flank of Von Buelow's
army had been exposed by the advance of General d'Esperey and the
retreat of General von Kluck. Information of this reached Foch,
and despite the danger of the maneuver, he thrust out his mobile
left like a great tongue. That night the weather turned stormy,
facilitating this move. At one o'clock in the morning, the statement
has been made, word reached General Foch indirectly that air patrols
had observed a gap in the alignment of the German armies between
General von Buelow's left and General von Hausen's right.

During the darkness and the rain, therefore, General Foch had worked
two complete surprises on General von Buelow. He had enveloped the
German commander's right flank, and was safely ensconced there
with General d'Esperey's army behind him, since the latter had
by now advanced to Montmirail. At the same time he had thrust a
wedge between Von Buelow and General von Hausen, threatening General
von Buelow's left flank as well. The first was a seizure of an
opportunity, executed with military promptness, the second was a
bold _coup_, and its risk might well have appalled a less experienced
general.

Considering the westernmost of these movements first, it will be
seen at once how the enveloping action brought about the "Affair of
the Marshes of St. Gond." General von Buelow's army was stretched in
an arc around the marshes, which, it will be remembered, have been
described as a pocket of clay, low-lying lands mainly reclaimed, but
which become miry during heavy rains. It was General von Buelow's
misfortune, that, on the very night that his flank was exposed,
there should come a torrential downpour. These same marshes had
figured more than once before in France's military history, and
General Foch, as a master strategist, was determined that they
should serve again. When the rain came, he thanked his lucky stars
and acted on the instant.

When the morning of September 9, 1914, dawned, the left wing of
General Foch's army was not only covering the exposed flank of
General von Buelow's forces, but parts of it we