re two miles to the
rear. Under the driving rain, morning broke slowly, and almost
before a sodden and rain-soaked world could awake to the fact that
day had come, General Foch had nipped the rear of the flank of
the opposing army, and was bending the arc in upon itself. Under
normal circumstances, such an action would tend but to strengthen
the army thus attacked, since it brings all parts of the army into
closer communication. But General Foch knew that the disadvantages
of the ground would more than compensate for this, since the two
horns of General von Buelow's army could not combine without crossing
those marshes, now boggy enough, and growing boggier every second.
The task was harder than General Foch anticipated, for the same
rainy conditions that provided a pitfall for the Germans were also
a manifest hindrance to the rapid execution of military maneuvers.
But, in spite of all difficulties, by evening of that day, the
flank broke and gave way, and two entire corps from General von
Buelow's right were precipitated into the marshes. Forty guns were
taken--to that time the largest capture of artillery made by the
Allies--and a number of prisoners. Hundreds perished miserably,
but General Foch held back his artillery from an indiscriminate
slaughter of men made helpless in the slimy mud. Thus ended the
"Affair of the Marshes of St. Gond," which broke still further
the German right wing.

Thanks to General Foch's further activities, General von Buelow
had troubles upon his left wing. When dawn of this same day or
torrential rain, September 9, 1914, broke over the hill-road that
runs from Mareuil to Fere-Champenoise, at which point lay the left
of General von Buelow's army, it witnessed a number of 75-millimeter
guns on selected gun sites commanding the right flank of the German
right center. General Foch's daring, the success of the maneuver,
and the fact that the conduct of all the French armies on that
day and the day following seems to be with the full cognizance of
this venture, led inevitably to the conclusion that those brilliant
feats, conceived by General Foch, had been communicated to General
Joffre in time for the French General Staff to direct the French
armies to the right and left of General Foch to cooperate with
his action. Had General Foch been less ably supported, his wedge
might have proved a weak salient open to attack on both sides.
But General Foch's main army to the west kept General von Buel