stood. Upon my own account, and not
simply as expressing the views of others, I have reached a conclusion
quite foreign to my thought before I visited the south. While it is
not possible to attach too much importance to the unity of China as a
part of the foreign policy of the United States, it is possible to
attach altogether too much importance to the Peking government as a
symbol of that unity. To borrow and adapt the words of one southern
leader, while the United States can hardly be expected to do other
than recognize the Peking as the de facto government, there is no need
to coddle that government and give it face. Such a course maintains a
nominal and formal unity while in fact encouraging the military and
corrupt forces that keep China divided and which make for foreign
aggression.

In my opinion as the outcome of two years' observation of the Chinese
situation, the real interests of both China and the United States
would be served if, in the first place, the United States should take
the lead in securing from the diplomatic body in Peking the serving of
express notice upon the Peking government that in no case would a
restoration of the monarchy be recognized by the Powers. This may seem
in America like an unwarranted intervention in the domestic affairs of
a foreign country. But in fact such intervention is already a fact.
The present government endures only in virtue of the support of
foreign Powers. The notice would put an end to one kind of intrigue,
one kind of rumor and suspicion, which is holding industry and
education back and which is keeping China in a state of unrest and
instability. It would establish a period of comparative quiet in which
whatever constructive forces exist may come to the front. The second
measure would be more extreme. The diplomacy of the United States
should take the lead in making it clear that unless the promises about
the disbanding of the army, and the introduction of general
retrenchment are honestly and immediately carried out, the Powers will
pursue a harsh rather than a benevolent policy toward the Peking
government, insisting upon immediate payment of interest and loans as
they fall due and holding up the government to the strictest meeting
of all its obligations. The notification to be effective might well
include a virtual threat of withdrawal of recognition in case the
government does not seriously try to put its profuse promises into
execution. It should also inclu