hus far to change
my mind on this point, nor in regard to the further belief that
probably the interests of China in the end will be best served by the
continuation of this deterrent function. But the question is bound to
arise: why continue the Consortium if it isn't doing anything? The
pressure of foreign powers interested in the exploitation of China and
of impatient American economic interests may combine to put an end to
the present rather otiose existence led by the Consortium. The two
stools between which the past action of the American government has
managed to swing the Consortium may be united to form a single solid
bench.

At the risk of being charged with credulous gullibility, or something
worse, I add that up to the present time the American phase of the
Consortium hasn't shown perceptible signs of becoming a club exercised
by American finance over China's economic integrity and independence.
I believe the repeated statements of the American representative that
he himself and the interests he represents would be glad if China
proved her ability to finance her own public utilities without
resorting to foreign loans. This belief is confirmed by the first
public utterance of the new American minister to China who in his
reference to the Consortium laid emphasis upon its deterrent function
and upon the stimulation it has given to Chinese bankers to finance
public utilities. And it is the merest justice to Mr. Stevens, the
American representative, to say that he represents the conservative
investment type of banker, not the "promotion" type, and that thus far
his great concern has been the problem of protecting the buyer of such
securities as are passed on by the banks to the ultimate investor--so
much so that he has aroused criticism from American business interests
impatient for speedy action. But there is a larger phase of the
Consortium concerning which I think apprehensions may reasonably be
entertained.

Suppose, if merely by way of hypothesis, that the American government
is genuinely interested in China and in making the policy of the open
door and Chinese territorial and administrative integrity a reality,
not merely a name, and suppose that it is interested in doing so from
an American self-interest sufficiently enlightened to perceive that
the political and economic advancement of the United States is best
furthered by a policy which is identical with China's ability to
develop herself freely and