nt fact,
symbolically at least, that the most powerful remaining tuchun or
military governor in China--in some respects the only powerful one who
has survived the vicissitudes of the last few years--namely Chang Tso
Lin, is the uncrowned king of the three Manchurian provinces. The
so-called civil war of the north and south is not, however, to be
understood as a conflict of republicanism located in the south and
militarism in the north. Such a notion is directly contrary to facts.
The "civil war" till six or eight months ago was mainly a conflict of
military governors and factions, part of that struggle for personal
power and wealth which has been going on all over China.
But recently events have taken a different course. In four of the
southern provinces, tuchuns who seemed all powerful have toppled over,
and the provinces have proclaimed or tacitly assumed their
independence of both the Peking and the former military Canton
governments--the province in which Canton situated being one of the
four. I happened to be in Hunan, the first of the southerly provinces
to get comparative independence, last fall, not long after the
overthrow of the vicious despot who had ruled the province with the
aid of northern troops. For a week a series of meetings were held in
Changsha, the capital of the province. The burden of every speech was
"Hunan for the Hunanese." The slogan embodies the spirit of two powers
each aiming at becoming the central authority; it is a conflict of the
principle of provincial autonomy, represented by the politically more
mature south, with that of militaristic centralization, represented by
Peking.
As I write, in early September (1921), the immediate issue is obscured
by the fight which Wu Pei Fu is waging with the Hunanese who with
nominal independence are in aim and interest allied with the south.
If, as is likely, Wu Pei Fu wins, he may take one of two courses. He
may use his added power to turn against Chang Tso Lin and the northern
militarists which will bring him into virtual alliance with the
southerners and establish him as the antagonist of the federal
principle. This is the course which his earlier record would call for.
Or he may yield to the usual official lust for power and money and try
once more the Yuan Shi Kai policy of military centralization with
himself as head, after trying out conclusions with Chang Tso Lin as
his rival. This is the course which the past record of military
leaders
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