ficials are the agencies by which political
and economic concessions were wrung from China while Europe and
America were busy with the war. But in China nobody even takes the
trouble to deny it or even to discuss it. What is psychologically most
impressive is the fact that it is merely taken for granted. When it is
spoken of, it is as one mentions the heat on an unusually hot day.

In speaking of the feeling of weakness current in Japan about Japan
itself, one must refer to the economic situation because of its
obvious connection with the international situation. In the first
place, there is the strong impression that Japan is over-extended.
Even in normal times, Japan relies more upon production for foreign
markets than is regarded in most countries as safe policy. And there
is the belief that Japan _must_ do so, because only by large foreign
sellings--large in comparison with the purchasing power of a people
still having a low standard of life--can it purchase the raw
materials--and even food--it has to have. But during the war, the
dependence of manufacturing and trade at home upon the foreign market
was greatly increased. The domestic increase of wealth, though very
great, is still too much in the hands of the few to affect seriously
the internal demand for goods. Item one, which awakens sympathy for
Japan as being in a somewhat precarious situation.

Another item concerns the labor situation. Japan seems to feel itself
in a dilemma. If she passes even reasonably decent factory laws (or
rather attempts their enforcement) and regulates child and women's
labor, she will lose that advantage of cheap labor which she now
counts on to offset her many disadvantages. On the other hand,
strikes, labor difficulties, agitation for unions, etc., are
constantly increasing, and the tension in the atmosphere is
unmistakable. The rice riots are not often spoken of, but their memory
persists, and the fact that they came very near to assuming a directly
political aspect. Is there a race between fulfillment of the
aspirations of the military clans who still hold the reins, and the
growth of genuinely democratic forces which will forever terminate
those aspirations? Certainly the defeat of Germany gave a blow to
bureaucratic militarism in Japan which in time will go far. Will it
have the time required to take effect on foreign policy? The hope that
it will is a large factor in stimulating liberal sympathy for a Japan
which is beginni