to the same set of
social forces and all three suffered from race prejudice. They also
faced in common a growing indifference to military careers on the part
of talented young Negroes who in any case would have to compete with
an aging but persistent group of less talented black professionals for
a limited number of jobs. Of great importance was the fact that the
racial practices of the armed forces were a product of the individual
service's military traditions. Countless incidents support the
contention that service traditions were a transcendent factor in
military decisions. Marx Leva, Forrestal's assistant, told the story
of a Forrestal subordinate who complained that some admirals were
still opposed to naval aviation, to which Forrestal replied that he
knew some admirals who still opposed steam engines.[9-1] Forrestal's
humorous exaggeration underscored the tenacity of traditional
attitudes in the Navy. Although self-interest could never be
discounted as a motive, tradition also figured prominently, for
example, in the controversy between proponents of the battleship and
proponents of the aircraft carrier. Certainly the influence of
tradition could be discerned in the antipathy of Navy officials toward
racial change.[9-2]

[Footnote 9-1: Interv, Lee Nichols with Marx Leva,
1953, in Nichols Collection, CMH.]

[Footnote 9-2: On the survival of traditional
attitudes in the Navy, see Karsten, _Naval
Aristocracy_, ch. v; Waldo H. Heinricks, Jr., "The
Role of the U.S. Navy," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei
Okamoto, eds., _Pearl Harbor as History_ (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1973); David Rosenberg,
"Arleigh Burke and Officer Development in the
Inter-war Navy," _Pacific Historical Review_ 44
(November 1975).]

The Army also had its problems with tradition. It endured tremendous
inner conflict before it decided to drop the cavalry in favor of
mechanized and armored units. Nor did the resistance to armor die
quickly. Former Chief of Staff Peyton C. March reported that a (p. 235)
previous Chief of Cavalry told him in 1950 that the Army had
betrayed the horse.[9-3] President Roosevelt was also a witness to how
military tradition frustrated attempts to change policy. He picked his
beloved Navy to make the poi