ding any further instructions it is submitted
that the alert which has been given in person and by telephone in
connection with the securing of the above data may be adequate
for accomplishing the objectives contemplated in the [McNamara] (p. 510)
memorandum."[20-35] If not conducive to substantive change in the lot
of the black serviceman, the President's intervention signaled in a
way clearly understood by Washington bureaucrats that a new style in
executive politics was at hand and a new awareness of the racial
implications of their actions was expected of them.[20-36]

[Footnote 20-35: Informal Memo, Evans for Judge
Jackson, 14 Mar 61, sub: Ceremonial Units and Honor
Guard Details. Remark repeated by ASD (M) in his
Memo for SecDef, 14 Mar 61, same sub. Both in ASD
(M) files.]

[Footnote 20-36: The Coast Guard incident in
particular seems to have impressed Washington. It
was cited by Mitchell, Wilkins, and Hesburgh during
their oral history interviews at the J. F. Kennedy
Library, and it continued to be discussed for some
time after the inauguration in official channels.
See, for example, Memos, Frederick Dutton for Secy
of Treas, 21 Mar 61, sub: Coast Guard Academy, and
Theodore Eliot (Spec Asst to Secy of Treas) for
Richard N. Goodwin (Asst Spec Counsel to
President), 25 Jun 61, sub: Negro in the Coast
Guard, with attached note, Dick [Goodwin] to
President; Ltr, Asst Secy of Treas to Tim Reardon,
31 Jan 62. All in White House Gen files, J. F.
Kennedy Library. The Coast Guard, it should be
recalled, was not part of the Department of Defense
in 1961.]

_The Department of Defense, 1961-1963_

The White House approach to civil rights matters was faithfully
adopted in McNamara's department. Despite a reputation for
foot-dragging in some quarters--Deputy Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric
admitted that neither he nor McNamara was especially interested in
personnel matters and that some of their early appointments in the
personnel field were inappropriate--[20-37]the secretary and his
assistants issued a s