Arabi Pasha had ordered a massacre of the
foreigners. The language of such historical facts is clear. It is well
not to forget them.

The Russo-Japanese War also is a warning how modern wars begin; so also
Italy, with her political and military attack on Turkey. Turkish ships,
suspecting nothing of war, were attacked and captured by the Italians.

Now, it must not be denied that such a method of opening a campaign as
was adopted by Japan and Italy may be justified under certain
conditions. The interests of the State may turn the scale. The brutal
violence shown to a weak opponent, such as is displayed in the
above-described English procedure, has nothing in common with a course
of action politically justifiable.

A surprise attack, in order to be justified, must be made in the first
place only on the armed forces of the hostile State, not on peaceful
inhabitants. A further necessary preliminary condition is that the
tension of the political situation brings the possibility or probability
of a war clearly before the eyes of both parties, so that an expectation
of, and preparations for, war can be assumed. Otherwise the attack
becomes a treacherous crime. If the required preliminary conditions are
granted, then a political _coup_ is as justifiable as a surprise attack
in warfare, since it tries to derive advantage from an unwarrantable
carelessness of the opponent. A definite principle of right can never be
formulated in this question, since everything depends on the views taken
of the position, and these may be very divergent among the parties
concerned. History alone can pass a final verdict on the conduct of
States. But in no case can a formal rule of right in such
cases--especially when a question of life or death is depending on it,
as was literally the fact in the Manchurian War as regards Japan--limit
the undoubted right of the State. If Japan had not obtained from the
very first the absolute command of the seas, the war with Russia would
have been hopeless. She was justified, therefore, in employing the most
extreme measures. No such interests were at stake for England either in
1807 or 1882, and Italy's proceedings in 1911 are certainly doubtful
from the standpoint of political morality.

These examples, however, show what we may expect from England, and we
must be the more prepared to find her using this right to attack without
warning, since we also may be under the necessity of using this right.
Our mobil