ary. In the first place, it is a folly
to imagine that good and evil have their existence for the sake
of prudence. For good and evil being already extant, prudence came
afterwards; as the art of physic was invented, there being already
things wholesome and unwholesome. For good and evil are not therefore
extant that there may be prudence; but the faculty by which we judge
good and evil that are already in being is named prudence. As sight is
a sense distinguishing white from black; which colors were not therefore
made that we might have sight, but we rather wanted sight to discern
these things. Secondly, when the world shall be set on fire (as the
Stoics hold), there will then no evil be left, but all will then be
prudent and wise. There is therefore prudence, though there is no evil;
nor is it of necessity for evil to exist that prudence may have a being.
But supposing that prudence must always be a knowledge of good and
evil, what inconvenience would it be if, evil being taken away, prudence
should no longer subsist; but instead of this we should have another
virtue, not being the knowledge of good and evil, but of good only? So,
if black should be wholly lost from among the colors, and any one should
therefore contend that sight is also lost, for that there is no more
the sense of discerning black and white, what should hinder us from
answering him: It is no prejudice to us, if we have not what you call
sight, but in lieu of that have another sense and faculty, by which we
apprehend colors that are white and not white. For I indeed think that
neither our taste would be lost, if bitter things were wanting, nor our
feeling, if pain were taken away, nor prudence, if evil had no being;
but that these senses would remain, to apprehend things sweet and
grateful and those that are not so, and prudence to be the science of
things good and not good. But let those who think otherwise take the
name to themselves, leaving us the thing.

Besides all this, what should hinder but there may be an understanding
of evil, and an existence of good? As the gods, I believe, enjoy health,
but understand the fever and pleurisy. Since even we, who, as they
say, have abundance of evils but no good, are not yet destitute of the
knowledge what prudence, what goodness, and what happiness is. And this
also would be remarkable, that if virtue were absent, there should be
those who could teach us what it is and give us a comprehension of
it, when