spects of these names are not empty and
vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality
represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.

Reply Obj. 3: The perfect unity of God requires that what are
manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and
unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet
multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold
manner, as things represent Him.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 5]

Whether What Is Said of God and of Creatures Is Univocally Predicated
of Them?

Objection 1: It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures
are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as
many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of
the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some
univocally--viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to
infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their
effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are
some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat,
although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems
that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an
univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is
predicated univocally.

Obj. 2: Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things.
Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to
the word of Genesis (Gen. 1:26), "Let us make man to our image and
likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and creatures
univocally.

Obj. 3: Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured.
But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is
homogeneous with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally
to God and to creatures.

_On the contrary,_ whatever is predicated of various things under the
same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no
name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures;
for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a
different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the
definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever
is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.

Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are
from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes an