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tions in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it. Reply Obj. 5: Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the manner in which the creature is subject to Him. Reply Obj. 6: To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary [to consider the order] of things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to Himself. _______________________ EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 8] Whether This Name "God" Is a Name of the Nature? Objection 1: It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God (_Theos_) is so called from _theein_ which means to take care of, and to cherish all things; or from _aithein_ that is, to burn, for our God is a fire consuming all malice; or from _theasthai,_ which means to consider all things." But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name "God" signifies His operation and not His nature. Obj. 2: Further, a thing is nam
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