bout God?
Objection 1: It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed
about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about
God are true; but affirmations are vague."
Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form
cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as
shown (Q. 3): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about
which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject.
Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.
Obj. 3: Further, every intellect is false which understands a
thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any
composition as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore since every
affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows
that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.
_On the contrary,_ What is of faith cannot be false. But some
affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One;
and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can
be formed about God.
_I answer that,_ True affirmative propositions can be formed about God.
To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition
the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in
reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case
both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those
which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and
"white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for the idea
of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same
applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the same thing which is
man is truly animal; for in the same _suppositum_ there is sensible
nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature
by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and
subject are the same as to _suppositum,_ but different as to idea. But
in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same
rule in some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the
_suppositum_ what it places in the subject; and what it places in the
predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the
_suppositum_; according to the saying that "predicates are to be taken
formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea
corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the
intellect signifies th
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