wn above. Hence it follows
that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as
distinct from each other.

Reply Obj. 1: The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the
order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode
of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the
infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken,
there will always remain something else outside. But God does not
know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after
part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively,
as said above (A. 7). Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from
knowing infinite things.

Reply Obj. 2: Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and
hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor
by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because
that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the
comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be
comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can
be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not as
if it were traversable.

Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not
quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of
measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things.
For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which
it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees
with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of
things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in
continuous quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients
held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and
finite being, because their being would be limited to some
determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the
knowledge of God.
_______________________

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 13]

Whether the Knowledge of God Is of Future Contingent Things?

Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future
contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary
effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said
above (A. 8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He
knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of
continge