reator" signifies the action of God, which is
His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal.
Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but
eternally.
Obj. 2: Further, that to which something applies temporally can be
described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to
make does not apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of
God temporally.
Obj. 3: Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as
implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all
things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of
God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from
eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I
have loved thee with an everlasting love" (Jer. 31:3). Therefore also
other names implying relation to creatures, as "Lord" and "Creator,"
are applied to God from eternity.
Obj. 4: Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that
relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it
cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case
God would be called "Lord" from the opposite relation which is in
creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the
relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be
in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied
to God temporally.
Obj. 5: Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for
instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if
the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it
follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.
Obj. 6: Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in
nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can
exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic.
v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not
simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God
to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus
these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from eternity,
and not temporally.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative
appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.
_I answer that,_ The names which import relation to creatures are
applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.
To see this we must learn that some have said that relat
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