time that his predecessor had secured the admirable position so
frequently spoken of in Affghanistan. He lands at Madras, after a
four months' voyage, in necessary ignorance of all that had occurred
in that interval of time, and to his astonishment he hears of the
insurrection at Cabul. He receives tidings that Sir William
Macnaghten and Sir Alexander Burnes, the envoy and representative of
the British Government, had been murdered; that the city was in a
state of insurrection, and that doubts were entertained as to the
security of the British army. What next? He arrives at Calcutta, and
there hears of the orders of his predecessor to hasten the
evacuation of Affghanistan, for the noble reason of inflicting as
little discredit as possible upon the British powers. He repairs to
Benares, and there he hears the tremendous news that not only you
had lost power in Affghanistan, but that you had so depressed the
spirits and shaken the confidence of the native army, that General
Pollock gives this melancholy account in a letter to Captain M'Gregor:
--'It must no doubt appear to you and Sale most extraordinary, that,
with the force I have here, I do not at once move on; God knows it
has been my anxious wish to do so, but I have been helpless. I came
on ahead to Peshawar to arrange for an advance, but was saluted with
a report of 1900 sick, and a bad feeling among the Sepoys. I visited
the hospitals, and endeavoured to encourage by talking to them, but
they had no heart. On the 1st instant the feeling on the part of the
Sepoys broke out, and I had the mortification of knowing that the
Hindoos of four out of five native corps refused to advance. I
immediately took measures to sift the evil, and gradually reaction
has taken place, in the belief that I will wait for the
reinforcements. This has caused me the utmost anxiety on your account;
your situation is never out of my thoughts; but having told you what
I have, you and Sale will at once see that necessity has kept me here.
I verily believe, if I were to attempt to move on now without the
reinforcement, that the four regiments implicated would, as far as
the Hindoos are concerned, stand fast. The case, therefore, now
stands thus--whether I am to attempt, with my present materials, to
advance, and risk the appearance of disaffection or cowardice, which
in such a case could not again be got over, or wait the arrival of a
reinforcement, which will make all sure--this is the real sta