disasters; I have heard it stated that very great errors were
committed--that those errors consisted partly in not keeping up a
communication by the straightest road between Cabul and Peshawar.
This may be just; these may be errors, but they are errors not
necessary or in any way connected with the policy of entering into
Affghanistan. I may mention another circumstance--that the
expedition into Affghanistan was undertaken under Lord Keane, who was
shortly after succeeded by Sir W. Cotton; he came home, and was
succeeded by General Elphinstone, who, from the time of assuming the
command, never appears to have been in the state of vigorous health
necessary for such a position. Are not these circumstances to be
taken into account? If my Lord Auckland had had at his disposal any
of those illustrious men who had honoured the British army in later
days--if such a man as Lord Keane had remained in Cabul--my
persuasion is, you would never have heard of such a disaster as that
which took place at Cabul."

We shall leave the Whigs to settle the question with their
subordinates, as to the precise degree of blame which each of the
parties shall bear. But there is seldom blame with the servants
without blame in the master; and it is one of Lord Ellenborough's
just titles to our praise, that he has been ably served by the
officers whom he so ably supported.

If our Affghan disasters were imputable to gross errors in detail,
was it not right to denounce the cause? It would have been a
melancholy thing if we had been thus betrayed and circumvented
without errors in our own servants. If British troops had been thus
cut off, notwithstanding the use of every prudent precaution, the
disasters would then have gone far to put in question the
invincibility of our military power. It was necessary to declare,
that by individual and special mal-arrangement, this unparalleled
disaster had arisen; so that none of our enemies should thence
derive a hope to crush us again, until at least the incompetent
officials of a confiding Whig Government should give them another
such opportunity.

The proclamation of Simla had another purpose--that of announcing
the future policy of the Government, and repudiating those designs of
aggression and aggrandizement which there was too good ground for
imputing to us, and which could not fail to inspire distrust and
suspicion in the minds even of friendly neighbours. On this point
nothing can be added to the