te of
the case. If I attempted now, I might risk you altogether; but if
you can hold out, the reinforcements would make your relief as
certain as any earthly thing can be.' What next? On the 17th of April,
Lord Ellenborough hears of the failure of General England to force
the Kojuck Pass. On the 19th of April he hears that Ghuznee has
fallen. And what next? This was a question which, I repeat, Lord
Ellenborough had from day to day to put to himself. But what next?
Lord Ellenborough had to contemplate the retirement of the British
force from Afghanistan. This was due to the safety of the British
army, after the proof that the king you had set upon the throne had
no root in the affections of the people, and that the army in
possession of Affghanistan was separated from supplies by a distance
of 600 miles. Finding this state of things, Lord Ellenborough
thought he had no alternative but to bring the troops within the
borders of British protection. For that difficult operation your
policy, and not that of Lord Ellenborough, is responsible. Those who
involved the country in an expedition of this kind, ought justly to
be responsible for its retirement."

It is needless to detail the difficulties in which the armies of
General Pollock and General Nott were then placed. Despondency and
desertion prevailed among the native troops, so as to render any
advance in the utmost degree hazardous, even if they had been
capable of moving. But of the means even of retrograde motion they
were utterly destitute. The explanations given in Parliament on the
vote of thanks to the army and the Governor-General, establish
beyond a doubt the absence of all means of carriage till the
indefatigable exertions of Lord Ellenborough supplied them with
every thing that was needed. The Whigs affect to disparage these
arrangements as belonging to the vulgar department of a
Commissary-General; and we may therefore infer that Lord
Ellenborough's predecessor would have deemed such a task beneath his
dignity, and left it to some delegate, who might have performed or
neglected his duty, as accident might direct. Had that been the case,
the chances are at least equal, that Lord Auckland would have been
as well and as successfully served in this branch of military
administration as he had already been in the occupation of Cabul,
and that further failures and reverses would have hung the tenure of
our Indian empire on the cast of a die.

The evacuation of Aff