despatch of the 4th of July is qualified by
heavy cautions. And should it not have been so? In addressing a
British officer with a field of exertion before him, so glorious in
a military, so hazardous in a political view, it is surely not the
spur, but the curb, that a civilian was called on to apply. The
courage of such a commander required nothing to fan the flame: The
danger, if any, was rather that he would rashly seize the
opportunity afforded him, than that he would timidly resign it; and
if he was not prepared to adopt the bolder course, in the face of
all the hazards which attended it, it was best that the enterprize
should not be undertaken at all.

But Lord Ellenborough knew his man. In appointing General Nott, in
March, to the command of all the troops, and entrusting him with the
control of all the agents in Lower Affghanistan, the Governor and
Council had desired him "to rely upon our constant support, and upon
our placing the most favourable interpretation upon all the measures
he may deem it necessary to adopt in the execution of our orders."
And in now giving him the option of retiring by Cabul, Lord
Ellenborough was assured that the General needed no other
encouragement to avail himself of it, than the feeling that all
counter-considerations had been stated and duly weighed. Every
preparation was immediately made to support General Nott in his
adventurous enterprize; and Lord Ellenborough writes to General
Pollock:--

"I am in hopes that Major-General Nott will to-day be in possession
of my letter of the 4th instant, and that you will, very soon after
you receive this letter, be made acquainted with the Major-General's
intentions. _My expectation is_, that Major-General Nott will feel
himself sufficiently strong, and be sufficiently provided with
carriage, to march upon Ghuznee and Cabul."

The result was such as had been looked for. The combined operation
of the two armies placed the Affghans at our mercy, and terminated,
by the ample vindication of our honour, and the restoration of our
imprisoned friends, our inauspicious connexion with these barbarians,
who had retaliated so cruelly the aggression we had made upon them.

It may be safely conjectured, that if these final triumphs had been
achieved under the direction of Lord Auckland, even though merely
retrieving the errors of his former policy, we should never have
heard an end of the eulogiums pronounced upon him. Lord John Russell
would hav