dark and midnight--of which I knew nothing until several days
afterward--resulted entirely from faulty execution of my orders.

I arrived at Spring Hill at dusk with the head of the main column,
having ordered all the troops to follow in close order, and (except
Ruger's troops, which I took to Thompson's) to form line on the
right of Stanley's division at Spring Hill, covering the pike back
toward Columbia. Cox's division, being the last, was to form our
extreme right. In that contemplated position, if Hood had attacked
at any time in the night we would have had decidedly the advantage
of him. I had no anxiety on that point. When informed, about
midnight, that Cox had arrived, I understood that my orders had
been exactly executed, and then ordered Cox to take the lead and
the other divisions to follow, from the right by the rear, in the
march to Franklin.

But it happened that only Whitaker's brigade of Kimball's division,
to which I gave the orders in person, followed Ruger's. Hence
that one brigade was the only force we had in line between Hood's
bivouac and the turnpike that night. If that fact had been known
to the enemy, the result would have been embarrassing, but not very
serious. If the enemy had got possession of a point on the pike,
the column from Duck River would have taken the country road a
short distance to the west of Spring Hill and Thompson's Station,
and marched on it to Franklin. The situation at Spring Hill in
the night was not by any means a desperate one. Veteran troops
are not so easily cut off in an open country.

NO SERIOUS DANGER AT SPRING HILL

The annotation upon the copy filed in the War Department of the
order actually given to the troops on November 29 explains how that
mistake occurred. In brief, the draft of an order prepared in
writing for another purpose, but not issued, was by some unexplained
blunder substituted for the oral orders actually dictated to a
staff officer. It was an example of how the improvised staff of
a volunteer army, like the "non-military agencies of government,"
may interfere with military operations.

The serious danger at Spring Hill ended at dark. The gallant action
of Stanley and his one division at that place in the afternoon of
November 29 cannot be over-estimated or too highly praised. If
the enemy had gained a position there in the afternoon which we
could not have passed round in the night, th