n my rear at Spring
Hill, but one to dislodge me from my position on Duck River by
defeating me in open battle. But I believed I could fight Hood,
even where I was, from noon until dark, and then retreat to Spring
Hill or Franklin in the night. At least I was willing to try it
rather than disappoint the expectation of General Thomas that I
would hold Hood in check until he could concentrate his reinforcements.
It seems to me clear that Hood's best chance at Duck River was to
force a general engagement as early in the day as possible, so as
to occupy the attention of all my infantry while his superior
cavalry was sent to occupy some point in my rear, and try to cut
off my retreat in the night. Perhaps Hood did not appreciate the
very great advantage a retreating army has in the exclusive use of
the best roads at night, especially when the nights are long and
the days correspondingly short--an advantage which cannot be overcome
by any superiority of numbers in the pursuing force, except by a
rapid circuitous march of a detachment.

HOOD'S MISTAKE AFTER CROSSING DUCK RIVER

As illustrating my accurate knowledge of Hood's character before
we ever met in battle, the following incident seems worthy of
mention. When Sherman's army, after crossing the Chattahoochee
River, was advancing on Atlanta,--my troops being in the center,--
General Sherman was on the main road, a little in rear of me. My
advance-guard sent back to me an Atlanta paper containing an account
of the visit of President Davis, and the order relieving General
Johnston and assigning General Hood to the command of the army.
General Sherman erroneously says one of General Thomas's staff
officers brought him that paper. General Thomas was then off to
the right, on another road. I stopped until Sherman came up, and
handed him the paper. After reading it he said, in nearly, if not
exactly, the following words: "Schofield, do you know Hood? What
sort of a fellow is he?" I answered: "Yes, I know him well, and
I will tell you the sort of man he is. He'll hit you like h--l,
now, before you know it." Soon afterward, as well described by
Sherman, the sound of battle to our right gave indication of the
heavy attack Hood's troops made upon Thomas's advancing columns
that day, which failed of serious results, as I believe all now
admit, mainly if not entirely because Thomas himself was near the
head of the column which recei