until, in my belief, further forbearance would lead
to disastrous results. I am thoroughly convinced of the necessity
for prompt and decided measures to put down this revolutionary
scheme, and my sense of duty will not permit me to delay it longer.
It is barely possible that I may not have to enforce the order
against the public press. They may yield without the application
of force; but I do not expect it. The tone of some of their articles
since the publication of the order indicates a determination to
wage the war which they have begun to the bitter end. This
determination is based upon the belief that the President will not
sustain me in any such measures as those contemplated in the order.
A distinct approval by the President of my proposed action, and a
knowledge of the fact here, would end the whole matter at once.
I desire, if possible, to have such approval before taking action
in any individual case. Indeed, I believe such approval would
prevent the necessity for the use of force. It is difficult, I am
aware, for any one at a distance to believe that such measures can
be necessary against men and papers who claim to be 'radically
loyal.' The fact is, they are 'loyal' only to their 'radical'
theories, and are so 'radical' that they cannot possibly be 'loyal'
to the government. . . ."
A REVOLUTIONARY PLOT
These men were styled "revolutionists" not without sufficient cause.
It was currently reported that they had in 1861 conceived the
elevation of Fremont to a dictatorship. In 1862, and again in
1863, they invented a scheme for the violent overthrow of the
provisional State government and the existing national administration
in Missouri. The first act of the program was to seize and imprison
Governor Gamble and me. In 1862 some of them committed the
indiscretion of confiding their plans to General Frank P. Blair,
Jr., who at once warned me of it, but refused to give me the names
of his informers or of the leaders. He said he could not do so
without breach of confidence, but that he had informed them that
he should give me warning and expose the individuals if any further
steps were taken. Here the matter ended.
In 1863 I received warning through the guard stationed at my
residence in the suburbs of the city, with which the revolutionists
had the folly to tamper in their efforts to spread disaffection
among my troops. This discovery, and th
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