ticism was tinged with the passions of the Civil
War. Yet a more impartial critic, though possibly an unfriendly one
because of his official position, made emphatic declaration to like
effect. On January 1, 1861, Baron de Brunow, Russian Ambassador at
London, reported to St. Petersburg that, "the English Government, at the
bottom of its heart, desires the separation of North America into two
republics, which will watch each other jealously and counterbalance one
the other. Then England, on terms of peace and commerce with both,
would have nothing to fear from either; for she would dominate them,
restraining them by their rival ambitions[63]."

If, however, one turns from the surmises of foreign diplomats as to the
springs of British policy, to the more authentic evidence of official
and private diplomatic correspondence, there is found no proof for such
accusations. Certainty neither Lord John Russell, Foreign Secretary, nor
Lord Lyons, British Minister at Washington, reveal any animus against
the United States. Considering his many personal ties with leaders of
both factions Lyons, from the first, reported events with wonderful
impartiality, and great clarity. On November 12, 1860, he sent to
Russell a full description of the clamour raised in the South over the
election of Lincoln, enumerated the resignation of Federal officials
(calling these "ill-judged measures"), and expressed the opinion that
Lincoln was no Radical. He hoped the storm would blow over without
damage to the Union[64]. Russell, for his part, was prompt to instruct
Lyons and the British consuls not "to seem to favour one party rather
than the other," and not to express opinions or to give advice, unless
asked for by the State Governments, in which case the advice should be
against all violent action as tending toward civil war[65].

This bare statement may indeed be interpreted as indicating an eager
readiness on Russell's part to accept as final the dissolution of the
Union, but such an interpretation is not borne out by a reading of his
instructions. Rather he was perplexed, and anxious that British agents
should not gain the ill-will of either American faction, an ill-will
that would be alike detrimental in the future, whether the Union
remained unbroken or was destroyed.

Strict instructions against offering advice are therefore repeated
frequently[66]. Meanwhile the first concrete problem requiring British
action came from the seizure by South