ntal proof that
subjugation is impossible[173]." A few provincial papers supported the
view of the _Spectator_, but they were of minor importance, and
generally the press heartily approved the Proclamation.

At the time of Adams' interview with Russell on May 18 he has just
received an instruction from Seward written under the impression aroused
by Dallas' report of Russell's refusal on April 8 to make any pledge as
to British policy on the recognition of Southern independence. Seward
was very much disturbed by what Russell had said to Dallas. In this
instruction, dated April 27[174], he wrote:

"When you shall have read the instructions at large which
have been sent to you, you will hardly need to be told that
these last remarks of his lordship are by no means
satisfactory to this government. Her Britannic Majesty's
government is at liberty to choose whether it will retain the
friendship of this government by refusing all aid and comfort
to its enemies, now in flagrant rebellion against it, as we
think the treaties existing between the two countries
require, or whether the government of Her Majesty will take
the precarious benefits of a different course.

"You will lose no time in making known to Her Britannic
Majesty's Government that the President regards the answer of
his lordship as possibly indicating a policy that this
government would be obliged to deem injurious to its rights
and derogating from its dignity."

Having promptly carried out these instructions, as he understood them,
Adams soon began to report an improved British attitude, and especially
in the Government, stating that this improvement was due, in part, to
the vigour now being shown by the Northern Government, in part "to a
sense that the preceding action of Her Majesty's ministers has been
construed to mean more than they intended by it[175]." But at
Washington the American irritation was not so easily allayed. Lyons was
reporting Seward and, indeed, the whole North, as very angry with the
Proclamation of Neutrality[176]. On June 14, Lyons had a long
conversation with Seward in which the latter stubbornly denied that the
South could possess any belligerent rights. Lyons left the conference
feeling that Seward was trying to divide France and England on this
point, and Lyons was himself somewhat anxious because France was so long
delaying her own Proclamation[177]. To me