a theory, not yet
clearly formulated for foreign governments, that the Civil War was a
rebellion of peoples rather than a conflict of governments, but he does
appear to have understood the delicacy of formal notification to the
constituted government at Washington[147]. Moreover his instructions
were in line with the British policy of refusing, at present, a
recognition of Southern sovereignty.

On the same day, May 6, a copy of the instructions to Lyons was sent to
Cowley, British Ambassador at Paris, directing him to request France to
join, promptly, in recognizing Southern belligerent rights. Cowley was
also instructed that the blockade and privateering required precautions
by European governments, and it was suggested that France and England
unite in requesting both belligerents to accede to the second and third
articles of the Declaration of Paris[148]. These articles refer to the
exemption from capture, except contraband, of enemy's goods under a
neutral flag, and of neutral goods under an enemy's flag[149]. This day,
also, Russell stated in Parliament that England was about to recognize
the belligerent rights of the South, and spoke of the measure as a
necessary and inevitable one. May 7, Cowley notified Russell that
Thouvenel, the French Foreign Minister, was in complete agreement with
England's policy[150], and on May 9, in a more extended communication,
Cowley sent word of Thouvenel's suggestion that both powers issue a
declaration that they "intended to abstain from all interference," and
that M. de Flahault, French Ambassador at London, had been given
instructions to act in close harmony with Russell[151].

The rapidity of movement in formulating policy in the six days from May
1 to May 6, seems to have taken the British public and press somewhat by
surprise, for there is a lack of newspaper comment even after Russell's
parliamentary announcement of policy on the last-named date. But on May
9 the _Times_ set the fashion of general approval in an editorial
stating that Great Britain was now coming to see the American conflict
in a new light--as a conflict where there were in fact no such ideals
involved as had been earlier attributed to it. Southern rights were now
more clearly understood, and in any case since war, though greatly to be
regretted, was now at hand, it was England's business to keep strictly
out of it and to maintain neutrality[152]. This generalization was no
doubt satisfactory to the public,