from
vindictive treatment, to secure for this great people their right, as
one united German-speaking State, to a place in the sun.

First we have to save ourselves and Europe, and then we have to stand
between German on the one hand and the Cossack and revenge on the other.

For my own part, I do not doubt that Germany and Austria are doomed to
defeat in this war. It may not be catastrophic defeat, though even that
is possible, but it is defeat. There is no destiny in the stars and
every sign is false if this is not so.

They have provoked an overwhelming combination of enemies. They have
underrated France. They are hampered by a bad social and military
tradition. The German is not naturally a good soldier; he is orderly and
obedient, but he is not nimble nor quick-witted; since his sole
considerable military achievement, his not very lengthy march to Paris
in '70 and '71, the conditions of modern warfare have been almost
completely revolutionized and in a direction that subordinates the
massed fighting of unintelligent men to the rapid initiative of
individualized soldiers. And, on the other hand, since those years of
disaster, the Frenchman has learned the lesson of humility; he is
prepared now sombrely for a sombre struggle; his is the gravity that
precedes astonishing victories. In the air, in the open field, with guns
and machines, it is doubtful if any one fully realizes the superiority
of his quality to the German. This sudden attack may take him aback for
a week or so, though I doubt even that, but in the end I think he will
hold his own; even without us he will hold his own, and with us then I
venture to prophesy that within three months from now his tricolor will
be over the Rhine. And even suppose his line gets broken by the first
rush. Even then I do not see how the Germans are to get to Paris or
anywhere near Paris. I do not see how against the strength of the modern
defensive and the stinging power of an intelligent enemy in retreat, of
which we had a little foretaste in South Africa, the exploit of Sedan
can be repeated. A retiring German army, on the other hand, will be far
less formidable than a retiring French army, because it has less "devil"
in it, because it is made up of men taught to obey in masses, because
its intelligence is concentrated in its aristocratic officers, because
it is dismayed when it breaks ranks. The German Army is everything the
conscriptionists dreamed of making our people; i