extended without an extension of the power of selling, the foreign
countries which supplied us with corn would evidently have their
power of purchasing our commodities increased, and would thus
contribute more effectually to our commercial and manufacturing
prosperity.
It has further been intimated by the friends of the corn laws, that
by growing our own consumption we shall keep the price of corn
within moderate bounds and to a certain degree steady. But this also
is an argument which is obviously not tenable; as in our actual
situation, it is only by keeping the price of corn up, very
considerably above the average of the rest of Europe, that we can
possibly be made to grow our own consumption.
A bounty upon exportation in one country, may be considered, in some
degree, as a bounty upon production in Europe; and if the growing
price of corn in the country where the bounty is granted be not
higher than in others, such a premium might obviously after a time
have some tendency to create a temporary abundance of corn and a
consequent fall in its price. But restrictions upon importation
cannot have the slightest tendency of this kind. Their whole effect
is to stint the supply of the general market, and to raise, not to
lower, the price of corn.
Nor is it in their nature permanently to secure what is of more
consequence, steadiness of prices. During the period indeed, in
which the country is obliged regularly to import some foreign grain,
a high duty upon it is effectual in steadily keeping up the price of
home corn, and giving a very decided stimulus to agriculture. But as
soon as the average supply becomes equal to the average consumption,
this steadiness ceases. A plentiful year will occasion a sudden
fall; and from the average price of the home produce being so much
higher than in the other markets of Europe, such a fall can be but
little relieved by exportation. It must be allowed, that a free
trade in corn would in all ordinary cases not only secure a cheaper,
but a more steady, supply of grain.
To counterbalance these striking advantages of a free trade in corn,
what are the evils which are apprehended from it?
It is alleged, first, that security is of still more importance than
wealth, and that a great country likely to excite the jealousy of
others, if it become dependent for the support of any considerable
portion of people upon foreign corn, exposes itself to the risk of
having its most essential supp
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