lies suddenly fail at the time of its
greatest need. That such a risk is not very great will be readily
allowed. It would be as much against the interest of those nations
which raised the superabundant supply as against the one which wanted
it, that the intercourse should at any time be interrupted; and a
rich country, which could afford to pay high for its corn, would not
be likely to starve, while there was any to be purchased in the
market of the commercial world.
At the same time it should be observed that we have latterly seen
the most striking instances in all quarters, of governments acting
from passion rather than interest. And though the recurrence of such
a state of things is hardly to be expected, yet it must be allowed
that if anything resembling it should take place in future, when,
instead of very nearly growing our own consumption, we were indebted
to foreign countries for the support of two millions of our people,
the distresses which our manufacturers suffered in 1812 would be
nothing compared with the wide-wasting calamity which would be then
experienced.
According to the returns made to Parliament in the course of the
last session, the quantity of grain and flour exported in 1811
rather exceeded, than fell short of, what was imported; and in 1812,
although the average price of wheat was one hundred and twenty five
shillings the quarter, the balance of the importations of grain and
flour was only about one hundred thousand quarters. From 1805,
partly from the operation of the corn laws passed in 1804, but much
more from the difficulty and expense of importing corn in the actual
state of Europe and America, the price of grain had risen so high
and had given such a stimulus to our agriculture, that with the
powerful assistance of Ireland, we had been rapidly approaching to
the growth of an independent supply. Though the danger therefore may
not be great of depending for a considerable portion of our
subsistence upon foreign countries, yet it must be acknowledged that
nothing like an experiment has yet been made of the distresses that
might be produced, during a widely extended war, by the united
operation, of a great difficulty in finding a market for our
manufactures, accompanied by the absolute necessity of supplying
ourselves with a very large quantity of corn.
2dly. It may be said, that an excessive proportion of manufacturing
population does not seem favourable to national quiet and happiness
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